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THE CASE FOR TREASON*
GEORGE P. FLETCHER**
"If this be treason, make the most of it."' Patrick Henry had no
fear of the ultimate crime against his King. Nor did the burghers of
Maryland who set ablaze the Peggy Stewart in Annapolis Harbor. One
would think that for us as Americans the crime of treason would carry
special significance. Our nation was born in acts of treason. The threat
of prosecution made the crime foremost in the mind of the constitu-
tional draftsmen.2 Indeed, treason is the only crime to find definition
in our basic document.
There are other indications that the crime of treason is central to
Anglo-American criminal law. First, the oldest statute in Anglo-Amer-
ican criminal law, enacted in 135 1 and still partially in force in Eng-
land,5 speaks to the first concern of all governments, namely,
suppressing treason. Also, the United States Federal Criminal Code
once began with a definition of treason.' Finally, in the mid-1940's the
United States Supreme Court decided two monumental cases -
Cramer v. United States7 and Haupt v. United States'8-each containing
* Paper delivered as the Gerber Lecture at the University of Maryland School of Law,
November 10, 1980.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. P. Henry, Speech in the House of Burgesses, Richmond, Virginia (May 29, 1765),
reprinted in 1 W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 86
(1891).
2. For a survey of the framers' concerns see Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 14-18
(1945).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, ci. 1.
4. Statute of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2.
5. See C. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 416 (18th ed. 1976).
6. See Pub. L. No. 350, oh. 321, § 1, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909). The treason statute is pres-
ently found at 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1976).
7. 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
8. 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
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long and thoughtful opinions on the constitutional foundations of
treason.
History, venerable statutes, our own Constitution and prominent
cases-all of these sources testify to the significance of treason in the
structure of our criminal law. Yet our casebooks and textbooks totally
ignore these materials. The basic criminal law course focuses on homi-
cide, sometimes on rape and burglary, but no one discusses treason.
The short explanation for this indifference might be simply that treason
prosecutions are few in number. In the United States they occur in war
time and in the aftermath of war. Since we are not now engaged in a
war, there is little point, apparently, in thinking about treason.
My case for treason is that we should take this ancient crime more
seriously in thinking about both the theory of criminal law and the
mainsprings of criminal conduct. A theory of criminal law tends to
abstract general propositions from the details of particular crimes. If
we ignore treason in formulating our general principles, we run the risk
of distorting the criminal law by overemphasizing violent crimes
against persons. In order to convince you that we should thrust treason
to the center of our thinking about criminal law, I shall spend most of
this lecture surveying the contours of treason. At the conclusion of my
argument, I shall turn to the lessons that we can learn from accepting
my case for treason.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
We should begin with the English Statute of 1351, which defines
two categories of treason, one called high treason and the other, petty
treason.9 High treason focused on disloyalty to the King and various
acts, such as counterfeiting the King's seal, that compromised the effec-
tiveness of the King's reign.' Petty treason was, in fact, but a species
of homicide in which the victim was a superior figure in a relationship
of fealty and obedience." The statute mentions homicide by a wife of
her husband; by a servant of his master; and by a priest of his prelate.' 2
Petty treason eventually merged with the crime of homicide.' 3 In its
original form, however, it accentuated the breach of a protective rela-
tionship as the core of treason. The wrong in petty treason was not




13. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 191 (West 1981), which explicitly integrates petty trea-
son into the law of homicide.
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only killing, but killing a protector to whom one owed particular
loyalty.
High treason also reflects the element of betraying a personal pro-
tector, namely the King both as the embodiment of divine authority
and as the supreme figure in the feudal system. It is important to keep
this element of breached personal loyalty in mind, for when we read
the Statute of 1351, it appears that high treason was meant to sanction
particular harms that had litle to do with loyalty and obedience to the
King. The statute prohibits not only counterfeiting, but also importing
debased currency, raping the women of the royal house, and levying
war against the King. 4 The King would obviously wish to suppress
these assaults, whether they were committed at the hands of a foreigner
or of a putatively loyal subject.
In the case of war against the King, however, the identity of the
aggressor defined the wrong. It was normal for the French and the
Spanish to wage war against the King of England. They committed no
crime in realizing Clausewitz's maxim: war is but diplomacy by other
means.' s But a subject's turning against his king and waging war
against him was and still is a criminal wrong of great proportions. The
wrong consists not only in the conduct--the subject's conduct is the
same as that of a foreign enemy. It is the element of personal betrayal
that makes the treason.
II. THE ROLE OF ALLEGIANCE
The element of breached loyalty, then, represents the first distin-
guishing feature of treason in the Anglo-American tradition. This fea-
ture helps us understand the role of citizenship in limiting the crime.
Note the requirement spelled out in the United States Criminal Code:
to be guilty of treason one must "owe allegiance to the United
States.""6 This means, I take it, that citizenship generates the kind of
personal obligation that characterized the feudal duty of English sub-
jects toward their King.'7 In defining treason, the Constitution remains
silent on the dimension of personal allegiance, 18 yet Congress has re-
stricted the crime, presumably to highlight the element of personal be-
trayal. The treason laws of most other Western countries similarly
14. Statute of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2.
15. K. VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 402 (A. Rapoport ed. 1968).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1976).
17. But see Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872) (holding that an
alien, while domiciled in the United States, owes a local and temporary allegiance during
the period of his residence).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
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restrict the crime. The English courts have read this qualification into
the Statute of 135 1. 9 The French2" and Soviet2 definitions of treason
also apply only to their respective citizens.
Think now about the problem of articulating the person or entity
to whom the loyalty is owed. We can easily understand what it means
to stand in a personal covenant with God or to stand in a personal,
feudal relationship with a protector, such as a king. When the nation
becomes disengaged from its personal leader, the notion of allegiance
becomes either idolatrous or diffuse. In our own legal culture, we
pledge allegiance, quite mysteriously, to the flag and to the American
Republic. In cultures presupposing a mystic connection of the people
to their soil, loyalty attaches directly to the homeland. Indeed, despite
the background of revolution, the current Soviet criminal code relies on
ancient and mystical notions in defining its version of treason.22 The
betrayal that lies at the basis of treason in Soviet society is not a be-
trayal of the Communist Party, or of the Soviet government, but of the
Russian Rodina-the motherland.23 The German National Socialists
held an analogous conception of loyalty, directed to the German Volk
as well as personally to the Fuhrer.24
This way of defining treason, which emphasizes the citizen's loy-
alty to his protector or his fatherland, is the dominant, but not the only
approach to the crime. In reaction against the abuses of the Third
Reich, the Federal Republic of Germany has chosen a totally different
approach to the crime. Section 81 of the German Penal Code takes the
current West German state and its constitutional system to be an inter-
est that the criminal law should protect.25 The current constitutional
order thus becomes analogous to other protectible interests, such as life,
liberty and property.26 Consequently, anyone who employs force or a
threat of force and seeks to undermine the current constitutional order
commits High Treason against the Federal Republic of Germany. 27 As
19. See Joyce v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1946 C.A. 347, 365 (American holding
British passport owed allegiance to the Crown). See also R. CROSS & P. JONES, INTRODUC-
TION TO CRIMINAL LAW 290-91 (9th ed. 1980).
20. CODE PENAL art. 70 (Fr. 1980-1981).
21. Criminal Code of the RSFSR art. 64. The name of the crime is izmena rodine, or
"betraying the motherland." Id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See Freisler, Der Volksverrat, 40 DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNO 905, 907 (1935).
25. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 81.
26. It is important to underscore the difference betweeen (1) treating the constitutional
order as a protectible interest (the current German situation) and (2) focusing on the loyalty
of citizens to their constitutional republic (the current American situation).
27. STGB § 81.
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aliens can violate the German prohibitions against theft and homi-
cide,28 they can also violate the prohibition against treason. 9 The Ger-
man model of treason dispenses with the element of personal betrayal,
and therefore, there is no reason to limit the crime to acts committed by
* citizens.
The current German model of treason encompasses acts of inter-
nal subversion.30 Most countries, including the United States and the
Soviet Union, distinguish clearly between treason and internal subver-
sion.31 Only citizens can commit the former;32 anyone can make him-
self liable for seeking to overthrow the government. 33 Subversion need
not derive from a foreign power, but treason typically entails identifica-
tion with a foreign enemy. The German model lumps these distinct
crimes into one.34
The current German model of treason, with its shift of focus to the
protection of a particular constitutional order, helps us understand
what our own conception of treason is not. We stand in the tradition
emphasizing the citizen's personal loyalty to his protector or to his
homeland. This tradition of loyalty yields a persistent tension in defin-
ing the contours of treason. The evil of treason consists not only in
threatening the security of the state or the constitutional order, but also
in breaching a personal obligation of fidelity.
III. THE GRAVAMEN OF TREASON: THOUGHTS OR ACTION?
How then does a citizen breach his obligation to the state? Is dis-
loyalty a matter of the heart or need the disloyalty be incorporated in
action that threatens the independence and security of the State? This
tension between disloyalty of attitude and disloyalty in action pervades
the history of treason in England and the United States. The conflict
comes to the fore under two distinct headings of treason. The first is
the historic crime of compassing the death of the King, and the second,
the contemporary problem of adhering to the enemy.
28. Id. § 7 (if these acts are committed against German citizens).
29. Id. § 5.
30. See id. § 81.
31. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1976) (treason presupposes allegiance) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2385 (1976) (crime of advocating overthrow of government does not presuppose
allegiance).
32. Butsee Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872) (holding that an
alien, while domiciled in the United States, owes a local and temporary allegiance during
the period of his residence).
33. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383-2385 (1976).
34. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. In addition, the German Code con-
tains an array of offenses designed to protect internal security. See also STGB §§ 84-86
(provisions bearing on unconstitutional political parties).
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A. The Crime of Compassing
The English Statute of 1351 suggests the possibility of treason by
thoughts alone, for it labels a traitor anyone who "compasses or
imagines the death" of the King, the Queen, or the King's heir.35 The
statute requires that the compassing or imagining be "provably at-
tainted by open deed," as other instances of high treason must be.36
Yet there is room to argue, as one finds the Philosopher arguing in
Hobbes' famous Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student, that the
crime of compassing "lyeth hidden in the breast of him that is ac-
cused."' 37 The open deed that declares the treason merely provides the
proof; it appears unconnected to the evil proscribed and punished.
The statute's design might have been to punish as a traitor anyone
who contemplated, and in that sense, "compassed" the King's death.
It is dubious, however, whether a totally subjective conception of trea-
son inspired the 1351 statute. Prior to the early nineteenth century, the
common law had no theory of criminal attempts.38 Therefore, in ap-
proaching this language from the fourteenth century, we have consider-
able difficulty distinguishing between an effort to prohibit attempted
assassination of the King and language designed to stigmatize the mere
intention to kill the King.
The debate whether compassing alone constituted treason has con-
siderable practical significance. If mere compassing was the crime,
then the overt act required by the statute merely functioned to provide
proof of the inner state. It would follow that spoken words would be
sufficient to constitute treason. Some royalists in the seventeenth cen-
tury favored this interpretation, thus endorsing a view of treason that
encompassed verbal expressions of disloyalty.39 Sir Edward Coke,
however, had argued strenuously against penalizing the oral expression
of opinion as treason.' The mere expression of one's thoughts might
provide evidence of compassing, but in Coke's view, the required overt
act had to tend toward completion of the crime.4 The open deed of
35. Statute of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2.
36. Id.
37. T. HOBBES, DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COM-
MON LAWS OF ENGLAND 97 (London 1681).
38. For a history of the law of attempts and a summary of the early cases recognizing the
doctrine, see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3 (1978).
39. See J. KELYNG, A REPORT OF DIVERS CASES IN PLEAS OF THE CROWN 15 (London
1789); cf. T. HOBBES, supra note 37, at 97 (The Philosopher, speaking for Hobbes, argues
that the "compassing" is the essence of the crime and "what other Proof can there be had of
it than words Spoken or Written.").




compassing had to be an act, such as acquiring weapons or taking other
steps to organize the regicide, that manifested and declared the treason-
ous intention.42 Restricting the overt deed in this way made little sense
unless one viewed the act as part of the crime of attempting regicide.43
Coke's views on these matters stood in opposition to those of royalists
who favored a broader conception of treason. The matter was open to
continuous debate and we can hardly claim that we know definitively
what the correct interpretation of the Statute of 1351 should have been.
B. Treason Under the Constitution
Treason by compassing failed to find its way into the American
Constitution." We do not regard the president as the embodiment of
the state or as the object of our allegiance. Assassinating the president
might be part of a subversive plan, but when there is no intent to aid
our enemies, the killing falls short of treason. And if the killing would
not constitute treason, then compassing the president's death should
hardly qualify either. In addition to these reasons for excluding the
English notion of compassing from our constitutional definition of trea-
son, the framers might well have feared the abuse of a provision that
comes close to linking treason to that "which lyeth hidden in the breast
of him that is accused.
45
Treason under the Constitution consists either in levying war
against the United States or in adhering to the enemy, giving them aid
and comfort.' Apart from the unsuccessful effort to convict Aaron
Burr, 47 the first clause has hardly figured in our national history. The
appellate cases center exclusively on the problems of adherence, giving
aid and comfort, and on the evidentiary requirement specified in the
Constitution, namely that the treason be established either by two wit-
nesses to the overt act of treason or by confession in open court.48
The interplay of these constitutional components poses the same
tension between treason in the heart and treason in conduct that we
42. Id. at 5.
43. For further discussion of this historical debate, see G. FLETCHER, supra note 38, at
§ 3.5.1.
44. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (treason limited to "levying war [against the
United States and] adhering to [its] Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.").
45. T. HOBBES, supra note 37, at 97. For a survey of the framers' concerns in drafting
the treason clause, see Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in Cramer v. United States,
325 U.S. 1, 9-20 (1945).
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
47. United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 470 (1807).




observed in the English crime of compassing.49 The requirement of
adherence brings into focus the element of inner emotional identifica-
tion with the enemy. Adhering is an internal process, even more subtle
than "compassing" regicide. The term originates in the English Statute
of 1351.50 Despite 600 years of thinking about the concept, we have yet
to clarify the particular attitudes and emotions that constitute adhering
to the enemy.
It's fairly clear, for example, that Iva Toguri, also known as Tokyo
Rose, adhered to the enemy as she made radio broadcasts on behalf of
the Japanese war effort.5 It is not so clear, however, that Jane Fonda
adhered to the enemy as she broadcast from Hanoi and attempted to
persuade American flyers to desist from their bombing missions.52 Be-
cause the military action in Vietnam was not a declared war,53 the
North Vietnamese may not have constituted the enemy in a constitu-
tional sense. Moreoever, apart from that technical problem, the degree
of Jane Fonda's attachment to the North Vietnamese may not have
qualified as adherence. It is one thing to commit oneself to the Japa-
nese war effort with a view to defeating the United States. It is quite
another to take measures to induce the United States' withdrawal from
a foreign military venture, even if those measures might benefit an en-
emy. Jane Fonda could claim quite plausibly, as Tokyo Rose could
not, that she was acting in the long-range interests of the country to
which she always remained loyal.
If treason is simply a matter of infidelity, then the psychological
phenomenon of adherence to the enemy requires no external manifes-
tation. If the citizen becomes emotionally identified with the enemy,
the relationship of fidelity suffers irreparable breach. One is reminded
of Jesus' admonition that a man who lusts after a woman commits
adultery in his heart.54 It is no accident, in my view, that Jesus chose
adultery in emphasizing the criminality of feelings. Adultery resembles
treason, for both represent a breach of fidelity. Indeed in Hebrew the
same word - bgidah-refers to both crimes. Adhering to the enemy,
49. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
50. See Statute of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2.
51. See D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951).
52. See N.Y. Times, July 15, 1972, § 1, at 9, col. 2.
53. See United States v. McWilliams, 54 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.D.C. 1944) (Germany did
not become a "statutory enemy" until war was officially declared in December 1941). Some
commentators have argued that the concept of "enemy" should be broadened to include
opponents of the United States in undeclared wars such as Korea and Vietnam. See, e.g.,




like lusting, occurs in the inner self. The betrayal is complete, as Jesus
perceived, even before one begins to act.
The National Socialists in fact took the theory of inner betrayal or
Treubruch to extreme. The infamous Volksgericht in Berlin found evi-
dence of disloyalty in telling jokes about the Fuehrer and even in ex-
pressing relief that one's child was a girl, who would not have to fight
for the Third Reich.5" These deviant comments were sufficient to es-
tablish the inner dissent sufficient to constitute a breach of loyalty.
Neither English nor American law has ever carried the concept of
treason by adherence to the extreme represented by National Socialist
practice. Two provisions of the Statute of 1351 hedged against a the-
ory of treason by thought alone.56 First, the statute required action on
behalf of the enemy as well as inner adherence: the action had to
amount to aid and comfort given to the enemy.57 Further, the com-
bined act of adhering and giving aid and comfort had to "be provably
attainted by open deed."5 Both these hedges against totalitarian
abuses of treason found their way into the United States Constitution.59
The elements of adherence and giving aid and comfort are carried for-
ward in the constitutional text; the requirement of an open deed be-
came the evidentiary requirement of an overt treasonous act.60
It was not until this century, however, that courts confronted the
problem of clarifying the extent to which disloyal intentions and feel-
ings could make out a case of treason. The objective requirements of
aid and comfort and of an overt act militate against finding treason in
thoughts alone. Yet the impact of these provisions remained unclear
until we faced alleged incidents of treason during World Wars I and II.
In United States v. Robinson6 decided in 1917, Judge Learned
Hand wrote a scholarly and influential opinion that stood squarely op-
posed to finding treason in the disloyal intentions of the suspect.62 The
question was whether the Government had adequately alleged an overt
act of treason in claiming that Robinson had made a trip to Holland
and that on a different occasion he made a public speech against send-
55. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Aug. 17, 1980, § VII, at 4, col. 1 (article on current prosecu-
tions of judges who sentenced others for treason violations in Germany during the Third
Reich).
56. See Statute of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, c1. 1.
60. See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. at 634-35; Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. at
34.
61. 259 F. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
62. Id. at 690.
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ing American troops to France. The Government introduced evidence
that the purpose of Robinson's trip was to carry secret messages to the
Germans.63 Indeed, there was little doubt that Robinson intended to
aid the German war effort. Despite this evidence of adherence, Judge
Hand reasoned, as had Sir Edward Coke three centuries before him,
that the requirement of overtness precluded conviction on the basis of
unincriminating, innocuous acts.6' Neither traveling to Rotterdam nor
delivering an isolationist speech in itself incriminated the suspect.
These acts acquired "their treasonable character," Learned Hand rea-
soned, "only from some covert and undeclared intent."65 The acts were
innocent on their face, and therefore they could not, in Learned Hand's
view, support an indictment for treason.66
Robinson was the leading interpretation of the overt act require-
ment when the first important treason cases reached the Supreme Court
in the wake of World War II. Both cases--Cramer and Haupt-had
their roots in a daring expedition by German saboteurs in June, 1942.
These saboteurs crossed the ocean in a submarine, landed in a rubber
dinghy off the coast of Florida, buried their explosives, and then pro-
ceeded to northern cities-at least two agents to New York and one
named Herbert Haupt, to Chicago.67 The two bound for New York
made contact with a German-American named Anthony Cramer.
They met at the Twin Oaks Inn on Lexington Avenue and at Thomp-
son's Cafeteria on 42nd Street.68 At one point Cramer agreed to take
and hold a German agent's money belt.69 During these meetings, the
three men were under surveillance by the FBI. At the second meeting,
the FBI agents intervened, arrested the two Germans, and turned them
over to a military tribunal for trial.7"
Herbert Haupt went to Chicago and looked up his parents, both of
whom were naturalized Americans. While under constant FBI surveil-
lance, Herbert spent several nights at his parents' apartment. His fa-
ther Hans accompanied him while he bought a car, and further, more
seriously, Hans helped Herbert secure a job at a defense plant.7'
In both of these cases there was ample evidence that the defend-
63. Id. at 686-89.
64. Id. at 690.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1942) (summary discussion of sabotage
mission).
68. See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 36-37.
69. Id. at 38.
70. Id. at 37-38.
71. See Haupt, 330 U.S. at 633.
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ants identified with the German war effort. There was little difficulty in
establishing psychological adherence to the enemy. Cramer may not
have known about the sabotage mission, but his admitted supposition
that the agents were in the United States illegally sufficed to demon-
strate his adherence.7 2 Upon his conviction for treason, Cramer re-
ceived a forty-five year sentence." Hans Haupt knew of the extent of
the mission, and for that reason, he received a death sentence following
his first trial and conviction;74 upon retrial his sentence was reduced to
life imprisonment." On appeal, there was little hope of challenging the
evidence of adherence, and therefore in both cases, the appellants had
to build their arguments on the Constitution's objective requirements
for treason. In Cramer, one could well dispute whether the suspect's
meeting with the saboteurs amounted to giving them aid and comfort.
Further, under the Robinson theory of overtness, nothing about
Cramer's having a meal with two German agents manifested his intent
to further the German war effort. This nominally innocuous incident
on Lexington Avenue appeared like the first step of betrayal only if one
knew from other sources that Cramer sympathized with the German
cause.
Cramer relied on Learned Hand's theory of overtness, arguing that
the testimony of the two FBI agents did not establish an act manifest-
ing an intent to side with the enemy.76 The Government replied with
its own theory of overtness: the overt act should mean the same in trea-
son cases as it does in the law of conspiracy.77 In the latter context, a
line of cases holds that any act in furtherance of the conspiracy suffices
as the overt act required by the definition of the crime.78 It does not
matter whether the act is incriminating on its face. Meeting with co-
conspirators would obviously be enough. These were the conflicting
theories, both of them plausible, that engaged the Supreme Court in
1945.
Five justices favored the reversal of Cramer's conviction 79-a cou-
rageous decision, as American troops were still dying on the battlefields
72. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 40 n.46 (summary of testimony of prosecution witness Norma
Kopp).
73. United States v. Cramer, 137 F.2d 888, 890 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
74. United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 1943), ail'd, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
75. Haupt, 330 U.S. at 632.
76. See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30-33.
77. See id. at 34 (summary of government's argument that overt act requirement was
met).
78. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1937) (making a telephone
call in furtherance of conspiracy sufficient as overt act); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347
(1912) (mailing a letter in furtherance of conspiracy sufficient as overt act).
79. Justice Douglas was joined by three other justices in dissent.
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of Europe. In Justice Jackson's majority opinion, however, it was not
Cramer's argument that prevailed. The Court opted instead for a com-
promise between the conflicting theories of overtness. Justice Jackson
wrote, "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in
a treason prosecution is that it show sufficient action by the accused, in
its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and
comfort to the enemy."80 This, the prosecution failed to do, for proof
of the meeting on Lexington Avenue did not demonstrate that the de-
fendant gave aid and comfort to the enemy.8' The Government argued
that the saboteurs had gained psychological comfort by "mingling nor-
mally with the citizens of the country with which they were at war."'8 2
The Court, however, held that the degree of comfort did not rise to the
standard of aid and comfort implicit in the constitutional definition.83
Justice Jackson commented that by contrast with these innocuous
meetings at the cafeteria, another incident could have constituted the
constitutionally required overt act.84 Cramer had allegedly taken and
stored a money belt with a large amount of cash as a favor to one of the
German agents. Though this act might have been sufficient to sustain
the conviction, the Government had withdrawn the allegation at trial-
apparently for want of evidence.
Having merged the issue of overtness with that of aid and comfort,
the Court had a clear basis two years later to affirm the conviction of
Hans Haupt,85 who had provided shelter to his son, assisted him in
buying a car and helped him get a job at a defense plant. These actions
provided sufficient aid to satisfy the Constitution's threshold require-
ment. Eight justices favored affirmance. s6
Justice Douglas wrote two opinons in these landmark cases, and in
both he strongly urged a theory of treason at odds with the majority's.
On behalf of four dissenters in Cramer87 and in a concurring opinion in
Haupt,8" Justice Douglas argued that the overt act required by the
Constitution had nothing to do with either proving injury (aid and
comfort) or with establishing the defendant's mental state (adherence
to the enemy). The sole purpose of the constitutional requirement in
Justice Douglas' view, was to establish that the treason had moved
80. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 34.
81. Id. at 37-38.
82. Id. at 38.
83. See id. at 45-48.
84. Id. at 38-39.
85. Haupt, 330 U.S. 631.
86. Id.
87. 325 U.S. at 48 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. 330 U.S. at 644 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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from the realm of thought into the realm of action. 9 Under this theory
of treason, virtually any action on behalf of the enemy would be suffi-
cient to convict.
Justice Douglas theorized that treason might inhere in acts that are
totally innocent on their face.9" Yet if the evidence of adherence does
not derive from the acts themselves, inordinate emphasis tends to fall
on the surrounding evidence of loyalty and patriotism. In its case
against Cramer, for example, the Government relied on proof that
Cramer once spoke rudely to someone soliciting war bonds9' and that
further, he had in his room a copy of the Constitution with check marks
next to the treason clause.9 2 This kind of inflammatory evidence insin-
uates that the suspect was the kind of person who probably would have
adhered to the enemy.
Appreciating the dangers of drawing these inferences from back-
ground incidents, Justice Murphy dissented in the Haupt case and ar-
gued that the overt act must be the centerpiece in the government's
proof of adherence. 93 Thus the required overt act should be one that is
"consistent only with the treasonable intention."94 It must be one that
"manifests treason beyond all reasc'-able doubt." 95 A good example
would be giving a military map to a known saboteur.96 In the Haupt
case, the defendant was the saboteur's father and this, in Justice Mur-
phy's view, rendered his acts ambiguous.97 Even though Hans Haupt
knew of his son's mission, providing him with food and lodging might
well have sprung from feelings of paternal affection rather than from
adherence to the enemy. As one of the alleged overt acts supporting
the conviction, sheltering his son was too ambiguous to meet the consti-
tutional standard. Thus, Justice Murphy reasoned that the entire con-
viction should have been reversed.a
IV. LESSONS FROM THE TREASON CASES
Of these various approaches to the overt act requirement, Justice
89. Haupt, 330 U.S. at 645 (Douglas, J., concurring); Cramer, 325 U.S. at 61 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. 325 U.S. at 42 n.49.
92. Id. at 42 n.50.
93. Haupt, 330 U.S. at 647-48 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 647.
95. Id. at 648.
96. Id. at 647.




Douglas' and Justice Murphy's views are particularly significant. They
both represent theories of liability that inform not only the treason
cases, but many other offenses as well. Consider the recurring question
whether we should punish as attempted homicide someone's putting
sugar in an intended victim's coffee cup. The would-be killer takes the
white powder from the wrong can; he thinks it is poison when in fact it
is sugar. If we extend Justice Murphy's theory about overt acts to the
general requirement of an actus reus or criminal act, then we might ask
whether the act of sprinkling sugar in a coffee cup properly constitutes
a criminal act. The act is innocent on its face; it does not manifest an
intent to kill. Therefore, Justice Murphy's theory would lead us to say
that the act is not criminal; and if not, there is no warrant for reaching
through the act to the intent and grounding liability solely on a subjec-
tive attitude toward killing. In contrast, Justice Douglas' theory would
tend to support liability for a criminal attempt. If we know that the
defendant thought the sugar was poison, sprinkling sugar does reveal
that the defendant's criminal plan has passed from the realm of thought
into the realm of action and therefore, according to Justice Douglas, we
have ample justification for punishing the mistaken effort to act out an
evil intent.
The conflict between these two general theories of criminal liabil-
ity remains unresolved.99 The Model Penal Code favors Justice Doug-
las' subjective approach,'0° but many judicial decisions in recent years
reveal strong support for Justice Murphy's position-that perhaps the
act itself should be the primary source of incriminating evidence. l°
The tension between these two theories proves to be one of the
basic themes in the history of criminal law. The development of the
modem law of theft illustrates the conflict between the view that a
trespassory taking must manifest the criminal intent and the view that
any taking, even one that appears innocent on its face, should suffice. ' 0 2
This general dialectic between what I have called manifest criminality,
on the one hand, and subjective criminality, on the other, lies anchored
in the rich waters of the treason cases. An appreciation of this broader
99. For an airing of some of the theoretical issues on both sides of this conflict, see G.
FLETCHER, supra note 38, §§ 3.3.3 - .3.7.
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1962). For an analysis of the state statutes adopting
and modifying the standard of the Model Penal Code, see Fletcher, Manifest Criminality,
Criminal Intent and the Metamorphosis of Lloyd Weinreb, 90 YALE L.J. 319, 338-39 (1980).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976) (reversing conviction
for attempted sale of heroin); Haughton v. Smith, 1974 2 W.L.R. I (reversing conviction for
attempted receipt of stolen property).
102. See generally G. FLETCHER, supra note 38, at §§ 2.1 - .4.2.
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tension in the criminal law derives from paying closer attention to theo-
ries of treason.
There are other important lessons that emerge from the study of
treason. Our general theory of criminal law holds that motives are ir-
relevant in assessing liability. If someone steals intentionally, it matters
not what his ultimate purpose might be, whether to supply his heroin
habit or buy Christmas presents for the poor. The secrets of the heart,
the ultimate wellsprings of human conduct, are thought to be irrele-
vant. Yet in the Anglo-American theory of treason we find that these
deeper subjective considerations lie at the core of the crime. 0 3 Adher-
ence to the enemy requires more than intent to render aid and comfort.
In principle it requires a deep emotional identification with the en-
emy. 'I Now we could say that treason is but an exception from the
general rule. Yet the "normal" and the "exceptional" are but reflec-
tions of the way we view the criminal law. We could as well say that as
the crime that protects our national independence, treason represents
the norm. Larceny and rape, as crimes that disregard motives, argua-
bly represent the exceptions.
If we tried to formulate general principles of criminal law on the
basis of treason, we should derive some intriguing results. The theory
of justification figures prominently in most crimes. Self-defense justi-
fies battery and homicide; necessity or lesser evils make it right and
permissible to commit larceny, abortion and some minor offenses. 05
Yet there appears to be no way to justify treason. Treason in self-de-
fense makes no sense, and similarly, treason as a lesser evil would be
hard to imagine. In contrast, the emphasis on adherence to the enemy
in treason cases invites counsel to rely on duress as a possible excuse. I0I
If the defendant acts under coercion by the enemy, one could hardly
find that as a psychological matter he or she adhered to the enemy
cause.
There is one important excuse, however, that figures less promi-
nently in treason cases. I speak of insanity. Our courts found Ezra
Pound mentally incompetent to stand trial on charges of treason. 107
103. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(1962). See also Chicago v. Mayer, 56 Ill. 2d 366,
308 N.E.2d 601 (1974) (conviction for disorderly conduct and interfering with a police officer
reversed on the basis of an Illinois statute adopting the Model Penal Code standard).
106. Rex v. Steane, 1947 K.B. 997 (Crim. App.) (coercive circumstances sufficient to dis-
prove an intent to aid the enemy). Claims of duress were asserted unsuccessfully in
D'Aquina v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) and Gillars v. United States, 182
F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
107. See M. BOVERI, TREASON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 182-83 (1961).
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Apart from this questionable incident, I know of no case in which the
issue of the alleged traitor's moral or mental competence came into is-
sue. We think of treason as a freely chosen betrayal. Traitors might be
mad - but not in the sense that psychiatrists can illuminate. Their
anger stems from their convictions. They hear the enemy drummer
and they choose to follow.
If we took treason as the representative crime, we would be more
skeptical about the claims of those who seek to brand all criminals as
sick or as the creatures of circumstance. Of course we would still find
the insane among those who commit criminal acts, but if treason had
anything to teach us, then we should appreciate more deeply the ele-
ments of choice and will in all forms of criminality.
If treason came centerstage in the drama of crime and punishment,
we would be more inclined to support retributive theories of punish-
ment. Those who choose to do wrong deserve punishment. Yet if we
thought of murderers and thieves as we think of traitors, we might also
be more compassionate in our approach to criminals. We would not
think of the "criminal element" as a class apart-persons different from
ourselves. We can identify with the treasonous acts of the Founding
Fathers and the treasonous efforts of a group of Jews in Leningrad to
seize an airplane and escape from the Soviet Union.0 8 If we lived
under Soviet tyranny, even under the domination of George III, we
could contemplate disloyalty. That we do not commit either treason or
other crime means that we may properly condemn those who do; but
that we are often closer to crime than we would like to admit, means
that we must feel a common bond with those whom we punish.
108. See T. TAYLOR, COURTS OF TERROR 6-13 (1976).
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